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INTRODUCTION 
With uncomfortable regularity presidents, be they Republican or 
Democrat and regardless of their foreign policy agenda, have expressed 
dissatisfaction with the intelligence they have received. Of late, Congress 
and the media have added their voices to those criticizing the perfor-
mance of the intelligence community. So commonplace have these 
criticisms become that charges of an intelligence failure now accompany 
almost every failed foreign policy initiative. Not unexpectedly, this 
dissatisfaction has also brought forward demands for reform that would 
provide policy-makers with greater control over intelligence. From the 
policy-maker's point of view, the control problem in this case is not one 
of curbing illegalities or excessive behavior as has often been the case 
with covert action. Rather, it is one of making institutional processes and 
individual behavior more responsive to the policy-maker's values and 
concerns. The hoped-for result is intelligence analysis and estimates that 
will prevent policy-makers from being surprised again. This paper ex-
amines the legitimacy of these expectations by reviewing the relationship 
between intelligence and policy, the concept of an intelligence failure, 
and the attack on the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut. 
Reform efforts designed to produce greater control of intelligence 
analysis and estimates have followed a regular pattern in which an em-
phasis on greater centralization is gradually diluted by bureaucratic com-
petition and the desire to insure that all competing points of view can be 
aired. President Nixon reorganized the intelligence bureaucracy in 1971, 
Ford reorganized it in 1976, Carter did so in 1978, and Reagan also made 
changes upon becoming president. Considerable attention has focused 
on the process by which national intelligence estimates are produced. In 
1971, Nixon replaced the Office of National Estimates (ONE) with the 
National Intelligence Officer (NIO) system. The ONE was created in 
1950 to draft national estimates. It operated in a collégial fashion with 
the professional analysts who served on it taking collective responsibility 
for the estimates they produced and approved. The NIO system replaced 
collegiality with individual responsibility for an estimate. Critics argued 
that the ONE system had become too inbred and insulated in its outlook 
and as a consequence was producing intelligence that was not responsive 
to policy-maker needs. Defenders of the ONE argued that the NIO 
system left the individual analyst too exposed to pressures from policy-
makers and would result in "intelligence to please" rather than quality 
analysis. Under Carter, the NIOs became part of the National Foreign 
Assessment Center (NFAC) which was under the control of the CIA's 
Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment. A national in-
telligence council was also created to give the NIOs a collective support 
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system similar to that which analysts enjoyed in the framework of the 
ONE. The Reagan administration returned the NFAC to its previous 
status as the Directorate of Intelligence and once again placed the NIOs 
under the control of the Director of Central Intelligence.' 
INTELLIGENCE POLICY 
The continuing dissatisfaction with intelligence and the persistent 
allegations of intelligence failures suggests that organizational solutions, 
at least as they have been carried out to date, have not provided policy-
makers with the control necessary to lessen the frequency of surprise. It 
also suggests that arriving at greater control may require re-examining 
the fundamental premises from which policy-makers proceed in phrasing 
the problem and searching for an answer. First, policy-makers tend to 
assume that a correct method exists for linking intelligence and policy. 
Under the best of conditions, the line joining intelligence and policy is a 
tenuous one, and as the brief review of organizational changes made in 
the production of national intelligence estimates revealed, no agreed 
upon formula exists for bringing the two together. One position holds 
that intelligence and policy must be kept separate.2 Excessive contact is 
seen as corrupting intelligence, robbing it of its ability to inform and 
warn policy-makers. Others maintain that the greater danger is ir-
relevance brought on by the production of intelligence in a vacuum. Un-
sure of the policy-makers' concerns and priorities, analysts are forced to 
rely upon organizational routine or personal intuition in producing in-
telligence.3 
In large part, no answer to the problem exists due to the conflicting 
dynamics of intelligence and policy-making. Unsure of what policy will 
work or unable to get a consensus on how to proceed, policy-makers try 
to keep as many options as possible open for as long as possible. 
However, having decided upon a course of action and finding themselves 
publicly (and politically) identified with it, they are reluctant to change 
direction and admit to a failure. From a policy-maker's perspective, all 
too often intelligence contributes little to either of these pursuits. In the 
course of presenting them with basic background information, analysis 
of current events, estimates of future developments, and warning in-
telligence closes more doors for policy-makers than it opens and holds 
the potential for undercutting policy initiatives. 
Second, policy-makers tend to treat intelligence as a free good. It is 
something "on tap" which can be accessed at any time. The costs 
associated with the collection, analysis, production, and dissemination 
of intelligence go unrecognized. Far more is involved than the monetary 
costs associated with each of these activities, considerable though they 
may be. The cost of collective intelligence for the U.S. exceeds $10 billion 
per year and encompasses such activities as reconnaissance satellites, air-
craft, ships, signals, intelligence stations, radar, underseas surveillance, 
and human sources." Significant decision costs also exist.5 These costs 
emerge in the process of coalition-building around an intelligence 
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estimate or the accuracy of a piece of information. They include infor-
mation costs, responsibility costs, intergame costs, division-of-payoffs 
costs, dissonance costs, inertia costs, persuasion costs, and pressures-of-
time costs. 
Third, policy-makers tend to equate surprise with an intelligence 
failure. The presumption exists that all events are knowable, and 
therefore when one is caught off guard, it is due to incompetent 
organizations or individuals who should have known to act differently.6 
Not only does this assumption fail to take into account the inherent 
limitations of individuals and organizations in processing data, it 
misunderstands the problems inherent in the process of intelligence 
estimating. Estimating the future involves artificially creating it through 
the construction of scenarios. Numerous problems confront the analyst 
who seeks to do so. First, there is the inherent ambiguity of evidence. 
Working with twenty-twenty hindsight, it is easy to pick out the impor-
tant pieces of information and identify unfolding trends. At the time 
events are taking places, this is not the case. Discriminating between im-
portant signals and noise, the natural clutter of useless information, is 
not easy. At Pearl Harbor, for example, the problem was not one of too 
few signals but too many irrelevant ones. On the eve of the attack, a 
great deal of evidence existed to support all the wrong interpretations of 
the last-minute signals being picked up.7 Complicating matters further is 
the fact that unfolding events do not automatically become more 
understandable as signals accumulate; major events do not come in nice, 
neat packages. The more closely the details of the terrorist attack are ex-
amined, the more loose ends one is likely to encounter. 
Starting assumptions also complicate the task of estimating the 
future.8 Events are not self-interpreting but gain meaning only when 
placed in a theoretical or policy-oriented context. If these assumptions 
are incorrect, incoming data are unlikely to be interpreted properly. In 
1973, Israel incorrectly assumed that Egypt would not attack until it 
could control the air space over the battlefield. Stalin incorrectly assum-
ed that Hitler would attack only after issuing an ultimatum. Because of 
these faulty assumptions, policy-makers and analysts failed to interpret 
properly the troop movements and military build-ups underway. The ac-
tions of the adversary form a third factor which complicates the task of 
estimating the future. The adversary always has the option of changing 
its plans. Warnings of attack may thus be correct even if no attack is 
forthcoming. Indecision on the part of the adversary similarly com-
plicates the task of estimating the future. Contradictory signals are 
received because the adversary is unsure of what it wants to do. By the 
time a consensus is reached, insufficient time may exist for policy-makers 
to be warned of an impending action. 
The fourth presumption made by policy-makers in expressing their 
criticism of intelligence and charge of intelligence failures is that had the 
intelligence failure not occurred, the policy would have succeeded. Such 
criticism understates the role that chance and accident play in world 
politics. It also tends to overestimate one's own importance in the play of 
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events. Robert Jervis found both of these tendencies to be prevalent in 
his study of how policy-makers learn from the past.' In the American 
case the tendency to define foreign policy problems as engineering ones 
for which permanent, technical, and nonpolitical solutions exist rein-
forces these mistakes. This orientation to foreign policy-making also 
brings with it both a sense of optimism that all problems can be solved 
and impatience when obstacles are encountered. 
THE CONCEPT OF AN INTELLIGENCE FAILURE 
Solutions to the problem of controlling intelligence based on these 
assumptions about the nature of the link between intelligence and policy 
are unlikely to yield significant or enduring improvements in the perfor-
mance of the intelligence function. More likely to take place are addi-
tional cycles in the pattern of reform efforts noted above. Corrective 
measures are possible if these assumptions are replaced by their opposite 
number: no single correct method exists for linking intelligence and 
policy, intelligence is costly to acquire, not all events and developments 
can be foreseen, and policies will fail even if intelligence is provided. 
Because it recognizes the many potential roots of intelligence failures and 
makes a distinction between being surprised and having an intelligence 
failure, this alternate set of assumptions serves as a more secure starting 
point for raising the question of controlling intelligence. 
Surprise is seldom absolute. Bolts out of the blue rarely happen. As 
Richard Betts noted, there is almost always some warning and usually 
some response.10 Assessing instances of surprise thus requires making 
judgments about what type of surprise took place. Two dimensions can 
be used to capture the relativity of surprise." First, at what level of ac-
tivity did the surprise occur. Distinctions can be made between technical 
surprise (whether or not a piece of equipment can perform in a certain 
manner) and doctrinal surprise (the concepts and ideas that combine men 
and equipment into a plan of action). The second dimension of surprise 
involves the nature of the surprised state's unreadiness: was the surprise 
one of whether the opponent would act, when it would act, or where it 
would act. Pearl Harbor, for example, involved both technical sur-
prise—the capabilities of Japanese torpedoes—and doctrinal sur-
prise—the nature of the Japanese attack with many at Pearl Harbor 
focused on sabotage as the primary danger. Yet, the U.S. was not so 
much surprised by the fact of the Japanese attack or its timing as by the 
location. The U.S. naval presence at Pearl Harbor was seen as a deter-
rent and not as a target. 
Michael Handel makes use of similar distinctions in the study of 
diplomatic surprise.12 Minor surprise involves an unexpected move which 
is limited in its impact on the nature of world politics and may be reversi-
ble. A fait accompli may have a major impact on the balance of power in 
the international system but is a surprise only in its timing. A major sur-
prise is unexpected in both its timing and object and has a major impact 
on the division of power in the international system. The point recogniz-
ed by Handel and echoed by students of military surprise is that not all 
10 
Conflict Quarterly 
cases of surprise are equally significant. Surprise becomes important the 
more thoroughly it negates the premises on which a state's planning has 
proceeded and prevents the effective application of that state's power. 
If surprise is able to take different forms, so too can intelligence 
failures. The inability to recognize this point has made the concept of an 
intelligence failure more of a hinderance than a help in diagnosing cases 
of surprise. Mark Lowenthal argues that the term should be restricted to 
those cases where the intelligence process fails to collect, evaluate, pro-
duce, or disseminate intelligence in a timely and accurate fashion.13 
Separated out of the concept of an intelligence failure by this definition 
are those cases where surprise occurred in spite of warning. That is, 
where policy-makers did not react to warning either out of disbelief, 
political paralysis, or a desire not to aggravate a dangerous situation. Of 
the ten cases he examined, Lowenthal judges only Pearl Harbor and the 
1973 Mid-East War to be intelligence failures. Gerald Hopple agrees that 
the concept of an intelligence failure has become over used and suggests a 
three-part typology for analyzing cases of surprise:14 (1) policy failures 
are a direct outgrowth of a state's defense or policy position; (2) analysis 
failures are due to the misinterpretation of data; and (3) technical warn-
ing failures are due to the failure to collect, process, or distribute the rele-
vant data to policy-makers. 
THE TERRORIST ATTACK ON THE U.S. MARINES IN BEIRUT 
The problem of international terrorism has always been very near to 
the center stage of the Reagan administration's conduct of foreign 
policy. Directly or indirectly, it has played a major role in a wide range of 
controversial foreign policy initiatives. Intelligence estimates on ter-
rorism were an early source of controversy within the CIA as DCI 
William Casey established his control over the agency, and the Reagan 
administration set its foreign policy agenda. Terrorism was also cited as a 
major reason for an increased emphasis on counter-intelligence. Retalia-
tion against Libya for its support of terrorism was used to convey the 
desired image of toughness and renewed vigor in U.S. foreign policy. An 
act of terrorism was also at the heart of one of the greatest foreign policy 
mishaps of the Reagan administration: the October 23, 1983, bombing of 
the Marine compound at Beirut which left 241 dead. The attack brought 
forward charges of an intelligence failure, charges which congressional, 
Defense Department, and newspaper investigations concluded were 
justified. But what type of intelligence failure was involved, and what 
type of improved control measures could prevent it from happening 
again? 
The U.S. Marine presence in Beirut had its roots in the June 6, 1982, 
Israeli invasion of Lebanon. The military objective was to secure 
Southern Lebanon and destroy the PLO. The political objective was to 
alter the political climate within Lebanon in order to give Israel a free 
hand in dealing with the West Bank and Gaza, and to lead to the 
establishment of a Christian-dominated Lebanon.15 Within three days, 
Israeli forces reached the outskirts of Beirut, and by June 14 they had 
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linked up with the Christian Lebanese forces militia in East Beirut. On 
July 2, Israeli forces instituted a military blockade of Beirut, and in 
August PLO forces and Syrian combatants had become isolated in the ci-
ty. In order to arrange for the safe evacuation of these forces, the 
Lebanese government called for an international presence. A U.N. force 
was not acceptable to Israel, and in its place a Multilateral Force con-
sisting of French, Italian and U.S. troops was dispatched to Lebanon. 
The Marine unit involved in the Multilateral Force had already con-
ducted the successful evacuation of U.S. citizens from the port city of 
Juniyah. The withdrawal of the 15,000 PLO and Syrian forces was suc-
cessfully carried out between August 25 and September 9. On September 
10, the Multilateral Force was withdrawn from Beirut. 
The situation in Lebanon took a decisive turn for the worse in mid-
September. On September 14, President-elect Bashir Gamayel was 
assassinated. From September 16-18, Phalangist forces massacred Palesti-
nian and Lebanese civilians in the Sabra and Shatila camps (camps 
nominally under the control of Israeli forces). In the wake of these events, 
the Lebanese government requested the return of the Multilateral Force. 
On September 26, the French and Italian units returned to Beirut. On 
September 29, the U.S. Marine contingent began landing at the port of 
Beirut. The 1,200-person contingent took up positions near the Beirut In-
ternational Airport separating the Israeli forces from the populated areas 
of Beirut. U.S. Ambassador Philip Habib stated that the basic objectives 
of the Marines were: (1) to bring about the withdrawal of all foreign forces 
from Lebanon; (2) following that, to restore the full sovereignty of the 
Lebanese government over its territory; and (3) to see to it that Lebanon 
would not be used as a source of hostile actions against Israel.16 
While the stated objectives of the U.S. presence in Beirut would re-
main unchanged, the conditions under which the Marines operated 
changed markedly. Initially, Beirut was a relatively benign environment. 
The Marines encountered a generally "passive attitude" according to 
General James Mead.17 He characterized Beirut as being a "minimally 
threatening situation" and attributed this to the perception held by many 
that the Marines were impartial peacekeepers. Gradually, this changed as 
consensus emerged that the U.S. forces were really biased in favor of the 
Christians.18 Support for this view came from the U.S. training of the 
Lebanese Armed Forces and the continuing failure to redress the political 
imbalance in the Lebanese government by increasing the number of 
Moslem officeholders. Viewed in a larger context, the presence of the 
U.S. Marines in Lebanon had little potential for being viewed as neutral 
for any long period of time. Not only did the Marines impact on the local 
balance of power, but the force affected the stakes that other states in the 
region had in the outcome of the struggle in Lebanon. Most deeply in-
volved was Syria which in turn had Soviet support. 
As views of the Marine presence changed, the level of violence in 
Beirut increased. Beginning in January 1983, Israeli Defense Forces came 
into repeated contact and conflict with Marine positions. In March, five 
Marines were slightly wounded by a terrorist's hand grenade in a 
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southern Beirut suburb. On April 18, a pick-up truck loaded with ex-
plosives destroyed the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, killing over 57 people in-
cluding 17 U.S. citizens. 
As fighting between Christian and Druze forces escalated in early 
May, the Lebanese government and Israel signed an agreement providing 
for the withdrawal of Israeli troops and the establishment of special 
security measures in southern Lebanon. No withdrawal of Israeli troops 
took place, however, because Israel predicated its exit on the 
simultaneous withdrawal of Syrian and PLO forces from Lebanon. 
These forces had not been a party to the agreement and refused to leave. 
The collapse of the agreement further angered the Moslem sectors of the 
population and produced an angry backlash against the government for 
having entered into it. 
Fighting continued to escalate in July and August. In the course of 
this fighting, mortar and rocket fire landed on U.S. Marine positions. 
The situation became more complex when on September 4 Israeli forces 
withdrew from the Alayh and Shaf districts of Beirut. This action pro-
duced another round of massacres and the further shelling of the U.S. 
position. On September 19, U.S. Navy destroyers provided gunfire sup-
port for Lebanese armed forces in their efforts to defend Suq-al-Gharb, 
the high ground overlooking the U.S. Marine position. While successful-
ly accomplishing its military objective, the shelling reinforced the 
Moslem community's belief that the U.S. supported the Christians and 
was not a neutral peacekeeper. On October 14, leaders representing 
Lebanon's major warring factions agreed to reconciliation talks in 
Geneva. Nevertheless, factional clashes and sniper fire continued. 
At 6:22 a.m., on October 23, a single terrorist driving a yellow 
Mercedes Benz truck drove through the public parking lot south of the 
Battalion Landing Team headquarters building in the Marine compound 
at Beirut International Airport and crashed into the lobby of the 
building. In doing so, it went through a barbed wire and concertina 
fence, passed between two Marine guard posts without drawing fire, 
entered an open gate, passed around one sewer pipe barrier and between 
two others, and flattened a guard's sandbag booth. The explosion pro-
duced by the over 12,000 pounds of TNT that it was carrying occurred 
while most in the building were asleep. It had sufficient force to rip the 
building from its foundation and cause it to implode on itself. Two hun-
dred forty-one Marines died and over 100 were injured. Not quite four 
months later, on February 7, 1984, President Reagan announced the 
withdrawal of the remaining 1,600 Marines from Lebanon. 
INVESTIGATIVE REPORTS 
Three notable investigations were conducted to determine what went 
wrong in Beirut. The Committee on Armed Forces of the House of 
Representatives held eight days of hearings and produced a 69-page 
report." The Defense Department put together a five-person committee 
chaired by retired Admiral Robert L.J. Long to study the incident.20 It 
produced a nine-part, 141-page report. The New York Times carried out 
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a four-week investigation into the bombing.21 All three reports were 
issued in December, 1983. 
The House Committee's Report made eleven points in its summary 
statement of findings and conclusion. The following observations are 
particularly relevant to assessing the nature of the intelligence failure. 
1. There were inadequate security measures taken to protect the 
Marine unit from the full spectrum of threats. 
2. The commander of the Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) made 
serious mistakes in judgment in failing to provide better protec-
tion for his troops. 
3. While the higher elements of the chain of command did not deny 
any requests for support from the MAU, they failed to exercise 
sufficient oversight. 
4. Higher policy-making authorities adopted and continued a 
policy that placed military units in a deployment where protec-
tion was inevitably inadequate. 
5. Marine leaders interpreted the political/diplomatic nature of the 
mission as requiring a high priority on visibility and emphasized 
that to the extent of allowing greater than necessary security 
risks. 
6. The MAU did not receive adequate intelligence support dealing 
with terrorism. Serious intelligence inadequacies had a direct af-
fect on the capability of the unit to defend itself. The Marines 
did not possess the capability to analyze the massive amounts of 
data at their disposal. 
7. Notwithstanding the above, the Marine command erred in not 
considering the possibility of a large bomb-laden truck as a 
threat. The failure is significant given the numerous other 
threats considered, the numerous car bomb threats, and an in-
telligence survey that recommended that trucks be usually in-
spected for explosives. 
The Defense Department Report made the following relevant points 
in its executive summary statement. 
1. The Marine "presence" mission was not interpreted in the same 
way by all levels of the chain of command. Decisions may have 
been taken without the clear recognition that the initial condi-
tions had changed dramatically. 
2. The chain of command did not take action to ensure the security 
of the MAU in light of the deteriorating political/military situa-
tion. 
3. Although the Marine commander was provided with a large 
volume of intelligence warnings concerning potential terrorist 
threats, he was not provided with timely intelligence tailored to 
his specific operational needs. HUMINT support (human in-
telligence) was ineffective, being neither precise nor tailored to 
his needs. 
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The New York Times made the following points in concluding its in-
quiry. 
1. Marine officers in Beirut and those above them in the chain of 
command did not consider terrorism to be the primary threat. 
2. The Marine commander in Beirut objected to the Reagan ad-
ministration's decision to bomb in support of the Lebanese 
forces for fear of the consequences it would have for the safety 
of his troops. 
3. Marine intelligence officers were deluged with raw intelligence 
reports about terrorism but were never provided with the exper-
tise required to evaluate them. 
Specific recommendations were also made to prevent a repeat of this 
type of intelligence failure. The Defense Department report recommend-
ed the establishment of an all-source fusion center which would tailor 
and focus all-source intelligence support to U.S. military commanders 
involved in military operations in areas of high threat, conflict, or crisis. 
It also called for steps to increase HUMINT support to U.S. forces in 
Lebanon and other areas of potential conflict. The House Committee 
cited the need for a special intelligence officer with expertise in terrorism 
to be assigned to such conflict areas. 
WHAT TYPE OF INTELLIGENCE FAILURE 
Building upon the earlier discussion of surprise and intelligence 
failures, a five-fold typology will be used to assess the preceding analyses 
of the Beirut bombing as an intelligence failure. A tasking failure is an 
intelligence failure due to the failure to identify relevant information as 
important for collection. According to the New York Times, the Marines 
did not consider terrorism to be the primary threat to their security in 
spite of being warned to the contrary. The liaison between the Marines 
and the Lebanese armed forces observed that when they arrived they 
"ran from tree to tree with their rifles pointed. They must have thought 
they were in Vietnam." He told them right away not to expect any classic 
offensives. The only threat was terrorism.22 
Yet, by training and doctrines, neither the Marines in Beirut nor 
their superiors in the chain of command were prepared for such a 
primary threat. The predisposition to downplay terrorism was reinforced 
by the nature of the expanding threat in Beirut. As identified by the 
House Committee, the problem of terrorism was masked by a growing 
series of concrete challenges. On landing, the first threat was from the 
large quantity of unexploded ordnance at the airport. This was followed 
by a series of political-military clashes with Israeli forces. Then came ar-
tillery fire from the mountains and still later sniper fire and convoy at-
tacks. 
Was this depreciation of the terrorist threat avoidable? To a large 
extent, the answer appears to be yes. Guidance in selecting and ordering 
collection targets comes from two possible sources. It can be determined 
by individuals outside the intelligence system (outer guidance) or by in-
dividuals and organizations within it (inner guidance).23 From a policy-
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maker's control perspective, outer guidance is important for it best 
establishes links between the remaining steps in the intelligence cycle with 
the policy concerns and priorities of the intelligence consumer. All three 
investigative reports found outer guidance to be conspicuously absent. 
Singled out for criticism were the upper levels of the chain of command 
for their failure to exercise sufficient oversight of the operation, to 
recognize the magnitude of the terrorist threat, or to appreciate the ex-
tent to which the situation in Lebanon was different from when the 
Marines first arrived. The mission statement the Marines received was 
brief, more political than military in nature, and worded somewhat dif-
ferently depending on its source. The result was confusion over just what 
was expected of the Marines and the relative emphasis to be given the 
competing objectives of visibility and security. The variously worded 
mission statements were as follows:24 
President Reagan in his notification to the Speaker 
of the House, under the War Powers Act, described the 
marine mission as follows: 
To provide an interposition force at agreed loca-
tions and, thereby, provide multinational force presence 
requested by the Lebanese government to assist it and 
the Lebanese Armed Forces. 
The mandate agreed upon by the nations making 
up the Multinational Force states: 
The Multinational Forces are to assure the safety of 
persons in the area and to bring to an end the violence 
that has tragically recurred. 
The mission statement issued by the military chain 
of command at the time set out the mission thusly: 
To establish environment which will permit 
Lebanese Armed Forces to carry out their responsibility 
in Beirut area. 
This failure to provide guidance was compounded by the tendency 
of higher authorities to avoid "second guessing" local commanders on 
their defensive measures. Only after the bombing did higher authorities 
conduct independent evaluations of these security measures. Having 
identified a tasking failure, it would also appear that the failure was not a 
significant one. As will be seen below, inner guidance did produce a vast 
amount of information regarding terrorism in Beirut. What gaps existed 
can be explained by other factors. 
A collection failure is an intelligence failure due to the failure to col-
lect relevant information. Both the House Committee Report and the 
Defense Department (DOD) Report were highly critical on this point. 
This was especially true of the DOD Report which stated that one of the 
intelligence reports specified the time or date of a predicted attack and 
most could not be independently verified. The DOD Report also criticiz-
ed the lack of HUMINT (human intelligence) available to the Marines. 
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The collection of intelligence was carried out by a variety of means 
and numerous intelligence agencies. DIA, CIA, NSA, and the individual 
military intelligence units all collected information. Tactical intelligence 
was available to the Marines from daily airborne and seaborne collection 
platforms. Supplementing these sources were frequent information ex-
changes between the intelligence units of the French, Italian, and British 
components to the Multinational Force and contacts with the Lebanese 
army. Included here were weekly meetings between intelligence officers 
from the intelligence services and the Lebanese army at which the lists of 
suspected car bombs, descriptions, license plates were given." 
All reports agreed that this system provided a virtual flood of infor-
mation on terrorism. If anything, too much information was gathered. 
General Paul Kelley states that he was given the descriptions of at least 
100 potential car bombs between June 1 and October 23. Between 
September 15 and October 23, one small section of an intelligence 
organization provided the Marines with over 170 pieces of information. 
General Mead recalls that he received so many warnings about a white 
Mercedes that he would tell his driver to count the number of white 
Mercedes they passed. In addition to intelligence on terrorism, informa-
tion was also gathered on conventional threats. The intelligence system's 
ability to locate artillery positions, tanks, and militia strongholds was 
considered to be excellent. 
To the extent that a collection failure occurred, it was one endemic 
to the collection process as it operates today. Virtually all accounts of the 
intelligence cycle stress the extent to which modern technology and the 
tendency to approach intelligence as a jigsaw puzzle (in which the key to 
success lies with finding a missing piece) have combined to overload the 
system with raw data. Calls for creating an all-source intelligence center 
or improving the amount of HUMINT available are unlikely to provide 
better control in collecting intelligence. More helpful would be greater 
clarity in tasking collection objectives and priorities. As noted above, the 
failure here was more external to the intelligence system that it was inter-
nal. 
The DOD Report called for greater HUMINT and greater specificity 
in the nature of the intelligence provided. In doing so, it voiced two of 
the fundamental misperceptions of intelligence that hinder the introduc-
tion of meaningful control measures. First is the notion that intelligence 
is a free good. HUMINT is not something which can be turned on and 
off. To be effective, calls for greater amounts of HUMINT to be 
available to military commanders in conflict or crisis situations require 
that these assets be in place well before the conflict begins. It also re-
quires a measure of good fortune, something which was absent in Beirut. 
While the U.S. officially had no contacts with the PLO, the CIA had 
developed a highly effective intelligence network in the Lebanese Palesti-
nian community. The disintegration of the PLO and its August 1982 
evacuation seriously damaged the U.S. HUMINT collection capability. 
Also, the April 1983 bombing of the U.S. Embassy killed the entire CIA 
staff in Beirut and though a new staff was quickly assembled and the 
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network of informants was unhurt, the changeover period was disruptive 
from an intelligence collection standpoint.26 
Second, the expectation that the specifics of a terrorist attack (its 
time, date, location, and means) can be foreknown reflects a failure to 
distinguish between what is realistically knowable from what is 
unknowable. Gathering intelligence on terrorism is a particularly dif-
ficult task given the secrecy, paranoia, and fanaticism that surrounds 
such activities and the small numbers of people involved. The same stan-
dards and expectations cannot be applied to it that are applied to gather-
ing intelligence on tank locations. An additional problem is that even if 
the desired specificity were obtained, the prediction might prove to be 
false. The terrorist always has the option of not striking if the defender 
looks to be prepared. This ability negates the specificity of an intelligence 
warning and leaves commanders with the same dilemma they faced hav-
ing less specific warnings. As General Mead noted: 
Initially after the American Embassy went, we went into 
a condition one-type situation. But then I began think-
ing . . . I'm wearing my men down, without more 
specificity of a threat.27 
This review suggests that the failures at the collection phase were of 
two types. First, and of less significance, was the common tendency of 
the system to collect too much information. Second, the more signifi-
cant, was the attitude of consumers to the intelligence they were reading. 
Greater control here needs to take the form of educating consumers to 
what they can expect from intelligence and how to respond to it. The in-
telligence failure was not the absence of warning but the inability to 
translate warnings into action. These are failures of process and policy 
more than collection. 
A processing failure is an intelligence failure to analyze information 
properly and make it available to the appropriate consumers. All three 
reports stress the existence of a processing failure. While abundant infor-
mation was available, there was no parallel capacity to analyze it. One 
specific failing cited was a thirty- to forty-hour backlog on processing in-
formation between the task force in Beirut and the one off-shore. The 
DOD Report commented critically on the failure of the FBI to place its 
report on the embassy bombing into CIA, DIA, and State Department 
communication channels. The report noted that had this been done 
perhaps the Marine commander would have had a greater appreciation 
of the magnitude of the terrorist threat. All three reports criticized the 
absence of analysts who specialized in terrorism. 
The Marine intelligence unit in Beirut was directed by a chief in-
telligence officer and a staff of five, two of whom were in counter-
intelligence. Marine officers stated that given the situation in Beirut addi-
tional counter-intelligence staff were assigned to the Marine unit. The 
battalion intelligence staff was under the direction of a captain or lieute-
nant and included a chief intelligence officer and two assistants. Infor-
mation collected by the CIA and NSA went to the Marines through the 
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European chain of command and arrived within hours of its dissemina-
tion in Washington. 
The picture, however, is not totally negative. The DOD Report 
acknowledges that intelligence provided a good overview of the broad 
threat facing the Marines. Representative Bob Stump (R-Arizona) stated 
that he was satisfied that intelligence did move through the system. In-
telligence officials also pointed out that: 
Along with the normal flow of information to the 
Marines, the National Intelligence Digest, a daily sum-
mary of significant intelligence information, contained 
several reports on threats in Beirut during the summer 
and fall, including one published on October 20 that 
specified that American forces in Beirut might soon be 
the target of a major terrorist attack.28 
The absence of analysts specifically trained in terrorism clearly 
stands out as a major processing failure. It is a situation individuals in-
side and outside of the intelligence system should not have allowed to 
happen. It is less clear how significant a failure it was. As the above 
quote confirms, competent analysis was carried out. Proposals for 
creating an all-source center plus the presence of analysts expert in ter-
rorism certainly hold the potential for improving the quality of the 
anlaysis. The greatest benefit of such measures, however, may not lie in 
improving analysis as much as in educating the consumer. Not 
themselves expert in terrorism and lacking analysts who were, the 
Marines did not heed the warnings. Analysts expert in terrorism might 
have been able to educate Marine commanders about what they could ex-
pect and make them more receptive to the analysis. This educatory role is 
not an easy one. Policy-makers cannot be forced to listen or to act on the 
intelligence they receive. An additional problem is created by the tur-
nover in personnel and the continuous insertion of new officers into the 
chain of command producing a rapid loss of institutional memory. A ter-
rorist attack ten months ago means far less to the person on the job two 
months than it does to the person in command at the time. 
A policy failure is not an intelligence failure perse, but a failure due 
to the pursuit of a policy which available intelligence suggests is flawed. 
Two different policy failures took place in connection with the Marine 
presence in Lebanon. One was the failure to act on the warnings receiv-
ed. At first glance, this failure is surprising given the April bombing of 
the U.S. Embassy. Other factors make it more understandable: the conti-
nuing expectation of greater specificity in threats, the numbing effect of 
constant warnings, and the Marines' interpretation of their mission as re-
quiring greater visibility. As General Mead observed, you cannot assume 
the worst and accomplish your mission. 
The second policy failure was the failure to re-evaluate the Marines' 
mission as circumstances in Lebanon began to change. The Marines were 
given an essentially political mission which they interpreted as requiring a 
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visible yet non-combat presence. The nature of this mission was in part 
responsible for placing the Marines at the airport (along with the location 
of the Israeli forces). The Beirut airport is run by the Lebanese as a sym-
bol of the authority of the central government. General Mead stated, 
"We did not want to accept the position but because of the low order of 
threat and the diplomatic requirements, it was acceptable."29 
The operational centerpiece of the Marines' mission was political 
neutrality. The DOD study cited the requirements for the success of the 
mission. The experience of earlier U.N. forces pointed to the need to 
keep extra-legal militias away from the Marines. Other assumptions in-
cluded a benign environment, the ability of the Lebanese forces to pro-
vide security for the Marines, a presence of limited duration, and their 
evacuation if attacked. The DOD Report goes on to note that 
developments in Lebanon had a negative impact on these assumptions. 
This point was recognized by the participants. The commander of the 
off-shore forces regarded his authority to bomb in support of the 
Lebanese army as a change in mission. Officers in Beirut objected to it 
because they saw it as compromising their neutrality and exposing them 
to greater danger. 
Corrective action in each case lies outside the realm of controlling 
intelligence. Once again, it lies with educating policy-makers. Betts 
argues that one key lies in not trying to prevent surprise but to minimize 
its consequencs.30 For Marine commanders, this would have meant not 
concentrating so many troops in one building where a single terrorist act 
could have such tragic consequences. Problems are greater with regard to 
encouraging a constant reassessment of the Marines' mission. We return 
here to the inherent tension between policy and intelligence. Committed 
to opposing terrorism and having a highly visible diplomatic presence in 
Beirut, the Reagan administration was unlikely to see the need to pull the 
Marines out or change their position. 
A final type of intelligence failure is a no-fault failure. Here, sur-
prise occurs even though no failures occurred in the tasking, collection, 
or processing of information, or in the policy line pursued. Just as 
"good" policy-making procedures cannot guarantee the success of a 
policy, so too chance, accident, and coincidence have their place in world 
politics and can affect the outcome of events. Given the above account of 
events in Beirut, this type of intelligence failure did not occur. It is a type 
of intelligence failure which one can expect to encounter in dealing with 
terrorism. 
CONCLUSION 
James MacGregor Burns writes that "leadership is the reciprocal 
process of mobilizing . . . in the context of competition and conflict, in 
order to realize goals . . . ,"3 ' The problem of controlling intelligence 
can be viewed in the same light. Control is achieved when policy-makers 
mobilize the resources of the intelligence community in a timely fashion 
for clearly articulated and communicated goals, and when the in-
telligence community collects, analyzes, and transmits to policy-makers 
the intelligence needed to formulate and implement policy. 
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It is clear that intelligence failures occurred prior to the Beirut 
bombing. By disaggregating the concept of an intelligence failure, 
failures were found in the tasking, collection, and processing of informa-
tion. Yet, a review of the intelligence system also reveals that these 
failures were not major contributing factors to the surprise that accom-
panied the bombing. Far more significant were the attitudes and actions 
(or lack of action) of the consumers of intelligence. Improved control 
over intelligence estimates in order to prevent future "Beiruts" must 
focus not only on the intelligence system but also on the controllers. In-
telligence consumers must be educated on what they can expect from in-
telligence and on the relationship between intelligence and policy. 
This task is especially urgent given the renewed willingness of the 
United States to inject military force into Third World trouble spots. Re-
cent U.S. actions suggest that these operations hold two problems for 
controlling intelligence. First, as the placement of Marines in Lebanon, 
the placement of naval forces in the Persian Gulf, and the invasion of 
Grenada illustrate, the decision to send U.S. forces has been made on a 
short deadline. In each case, the perceived need to act appears to have 
outpaced the ability of intelligence to inform the decision-making pro-
cess or consumer interest in intelligence. While the invasion of Grenada 
was a "success," it was not without serious lapses in the quality of the in-
telligence on hand: accurate maps were not available, there was a lack of 
information on the quality and number of enemy forces, and the location 
of all of the U.S. medical students was not known. 
Second, the political dimension to these operations holds the poten-
tial for greatly complicating the consumer-producer relationship. The 
mission of both the Marines in Lebanon and the naval task force in the 
Persian Gulf was as much political as military. This created a tension bet-
ween the military/security needs of the forces present and the political re-
quirement that they have a visible and calming presence. The existence of 
such competing objectives makes it difficult for intelligence to influence 
policy deliberations in a constructive fashion. Intelligence relevant to one 
mission may be irrelevant to or produce a negative effect on another. 
Neither policy-makers nor intelligence professionals may be sure about 
the desired mix between objectives, and officials on the scene and those 
in Washington may see the situation differently. The result, as the bomb-
ing of the Marine barracks and the attack on the USS Stark 
demonstrated, can be tragic. 
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